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Prices and Wages
Writers who believe that, in the economy at large, profits per unit
of business done tend to deteriorate at some time during expansion
and to improve in contraction do not rest their views entirely on
supposed variations in the physical relation of input to output. In
some industries or sectors of the economy, they suppose, the
prices received by business enterprisesin expansion rise less
rapidly than the prices and wage rates paid; in contraction, prices
received fall less than prices and wage rates paid. In the case of
railroads and public utilities, it is sometimes thought, govern-
mental regulation of prices received results in inflexibility and
hence makes disturbances of price-wage relations particularly
likely.
PRICES RECEIVED DID NOT RISE AND FALL WITH TRAFFIC OR
BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Unit revenue must be our guide
In the railroad industry 'prices received' means, principally,
freight rates and passenger fares. At any moment there must be
literally millions of them in the tariffs. Questions about their cy-
clical variation therefore have to be phrased in terms of some kind
of an average or index. Ideally, perhaps, such an index should be
computed by multiplying every rate, fare, or other charge in effect
on any specified date by the amount of traffic that moved under
the comparable rate in some base period, totaling the resulting
products, a.nd expressing the total as a percentage of aggregate
revenue in the base period. To follow this procedure in exact detail
L
.y
proximationto it would be possible after much research. While
various investigators have constructed indexes of freight rates for
various periods and segments of traffic, no one has yet devised a
rename aJUOLcomprenensiveinaexan atone one
for freight rates, passenger fares, and all the miscellaneous kinds
of railway charges. The nearest equivalent is a series of annual or
monthly ratios we have computed by dividing traffic units into
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total operating revenue. We call the result 'revenue per traffic
unit'.
Any widespread and substantial change in railway charges must
affect this average. But the figure is affected also by something
else—changes in the composition of traffic. Different commodities,
moving over the same stretch of railway, pay different rates and
hence yield different earnings per ton-mile. Rates on any one com-
modity, although they usually rise with distance, seldom rise pro-
portionately; hence one shipment, moving a short distance, will
pay higher revenue per ton-mile than another shipment of the
same commodity moving a longer distance in the same general
area. Rates in the South and West are sometimes higher than in
the East; a shipment moving in one territory not infrequently
yields more revenue per ton-mile than a similar shipment moving
the same distance in another. Hence revenue per ton-mile is
affected by the composition of traffic, distances of movement, and
the proportion of movement occurring in different parts of the
country. Analogous remarks apply to revenue per passenger-mile.
Revenue per traffic unit is influenced by changes not only in the
composition of freight traffic and of travel but also in the relative
importance ofton-miles, passenger-miles, and other sources
of receipts.
The importance of changes in composition, however, can easily
be exaggerated. From data for 1929 and 1932 we can determine
how a major cyclical change in composition by commodities, with-
out any change in the unit revenue derived from any one of them,
would affect the average unit revenue derived from all carload
traffic, which contributes roughly 70 percent of total operating
revenue. The hypothetical ton-miles shown in Table 77, even
though we have used 1932 average hauls in computing them, must
bear a considerable resemblance in composition to the actual 1929
ton-miles, for we have used the 1929 tonnages.' The shift in com-
modity make-up from a hypothetical 1929-like year to the actual
year 1932 does not raise the unit revenue from the entire carload
traffic; indeed it lowers the figure a trifle, from 1.0350 to 1.0308
cents.
Revenue per unit freight traffic could be affected also by
changes in the relative importance of less-than-carload ton-miles,
'As noted in Chapter 1, the only year within ourperiodfor which data on ton-
miles by commodities are available is 1932.PRICES AND WAGES 233
unit revenue from which must be comparatively high. But only
10.6 percent of the freight revenue came from this source in 1928
(the first year for which there are data). Thereafter the percentage
diminished fairly steadily to 5.1 in 1944. (In earlier years, how-
ever, the figure was probably somewhat higher than 10.6.)
Table 77









1,303,048 (1) Tons originated, 1929 (thousands)a
(2) Average haul, 1932 (miles)b 219.31182.44 822.53 322.92
(3) Hypothetical ton-miles, (1) x (2)
(millions)
8,627 3,489 3,038 420,772c
(4) Revenue per ton-mile; 1932 (cents)1.04701 .1367 3.7405 1. 0308d
(5) Hypothetical revenue, (3) x (4)90,32539,659113,636
($000) a
a A larger number of digits was used in the actual computations.
b Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Freight Traffic Report, App. I, pp. 74, 75.
Sum of 156 products similar to those illustrated.
d Actual figure for 1932 traffic. For the hypothetical traffic the figure is 1.0350 cents
($4,354,966 ÷ 420,772).
Without alteration in freight revenue per ton-mile or passenger
revenue per passenger-mile, operating revenue per traffic unit
could change because of a shift in the relative importance of freight
movement and travel. How much would depend partly on the
size of the shift and partly on the degree to which the ratio of reve-
nue per passenger-mile to revenue per ton-mile diverges from 2.4,
the factor by which we equate passenger-miles to ton-miles. Even.
if we make rather extreme assumptions concerning both, however,
revenue per traffic unit would be raised or lowered less than 2 per-
cent.2
2 In the first and second of two periods, respectively, let ton-miles equaland
t2, passenger-miles r1t1 and r2t2, operating revenue per traffic unit P1 and P2.
Let freight revenue per ton-mile equal p and passenger revenue per passenger-
mile ap in both periods. Assume that miscellaneous operating revenues either
are zero or are the same percentage of freight plus passenger revenues in both
periods. Then it can be proved that
1 + ar2
P2 1 + 2.4rs
Pi 1+ar1
1 + 2.4r1
























Operating Revenue per Traffic Unit, July 1907—December 1938
Cents
C
Co Shaded periods are contractions in traffic unitt.
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CHART 96
Operating Revenue per Traffic Unit, and Freight
Revenue per Ton-mile, 1890—1909
Cents
Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units and ton-miles
(trough in former in 1895, in latter in 1894).
Althoughthese tests are not exhaustive, they encourage us to
believe that variations in composition are not likely to offset or
conceal any substantial and general change in rates, fares, and
other charges. Major fluctuations in the level of rates, etc., should
be reflected in revenue per traffic unit.
It did not even conform positively to traffic
Yet when we examine the curve of unit revenue we fail to discern
any clear-cut cycles bearing a systematic relation to those in traffic
(Charts 95 and 96). In 4 of 8 phases of rising traffic after 1908 there
was a net decline in revenue per unit, in 6 of 8 falling phases a net
increase (Table 78). The computations, like those from earlier,
difference betweenr1andand partly on that between a and 2.4. The largest
changein theratio of passenger-miles toton-milesin any phase oftrafficunits was
_
s.,m.; ',.
thereforemean an extremely large shift. From 1882 to 1944 the value of a ranged
from its maximum of 2.880 in 1917 to its minimum of 1.838 in 1940. Either 2.9 or 1.8
represents an extreme departure from 2.4. Substituting .12, .08, and 2.9 in the fore-
going equation we get .988; substituting .12, .08, and 1.8 we get 1.017.236 9
Table 78
Operating Revenue per Traffic Unit: Change per Month, 1908—38, and
b By comparison with preceding rate, e.g., .0000 with .0019
Annual data on traffic units,it should be remembered, reveal no 1910—11 con-
traction; consequently, in this section, the phase beginning in 1908 runs to 1913.
annual data suggest inverse conformity. Most of the net differ-
ences were rather small, percentagewise. (The irregular variation
within each phase looks unusually large in comparison.) Altering
composition may account for most of them; they do not prove
that rates, fares, etc. actually declined in expansion or rose in con-
traction. But we can infer with reasonable certainty that the rail-
roads did not regularly and materially raise their charges during
the former or reduce them during the latter. For the understanding




1893—1913, between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units
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average, 1908—38 section; date of turn is middle month.PRICES AND WAGES 237
Table 79
Freight Revenue per Ton-mile at Peaks and Troughs in Ton-miles,
1908-4938
Turn in ton-miles RevenueDirection Turn in ton-miles Revenue Direction
per of change perof change
ton_milea from from
Date Level (cents)prec. date Date Level (cents)prec. date
Feb. 1908Trough.753... Feb.1920Peak .986
Mar. 1910Peak .709 — July1921Trough1.292+
Feb. 1911Trough.720+ Apr. 192SPeak 1.099 —
May1913Peak .675 — June1924Trough1.114+
Dee. 1914Trough b July 1926Peak 1.079 —
Apr.1918Peak .705... Dec.1927Trough1.100+
Mar. 1919Trough.915+ Aug. 1929Peak 1.084 —
Feb.1920Peak .890 — July1932Trough1.069 —
Apr.1937Peak 0.933 —
May1938Trough0.994+
a Three-month average; date of turn is middle month. Nonrevenue ton-miles in-
cluded in divisor, 1908—20 section.
b No data.
When we consider freight and passenger earnings separately, we
find that freight revenue per ton-mile showed a rather well defined
inverse relation to traffic, at least after 1908. It fell in all 7 ex-
pansions in ton-miles for which we have monthly data, rose in all
7 contractions except 1929—32 (Table 79). Even in that instance,
the rate of decline, .0004 cents per month, was less rapid than
the rate in 1927—29, .0008 cents, or in 1932—37, .0024 cents. Com-
parisons involving earlier phases and based on annual data, how-
ever, somewhat reduce the consistency of the entire record: only
2 of 5 suggest inverse conformity (Table 80). Specific phases in
revenue per ton-mile itself contain jiggly fluctuations from month
to month that are rather large compared with the total specific
swing (Chart 97). With some effort we can match each phase in
ton-miles with one of opposite character in unit revenue, except
in 1911—13, when a full cycle in average earnings roughly corre-
sponds to the physical expansion. (The brief rise in revenue per
ton-mile in 1936 may fairly be regarded as a minor interruption
of a movement.) But. to do this we must sometimes
link phases of greatly different length. We must regard the traffic
expansion of 1927—29 as corresponding to a much longer earnings
contraction; as a corollary we must pair the long ton-mile con-
traction of with a very brief rise in earnings toward itsTable 80
Revenue per Ton-mile







Years from preceding date
Revenue per ton-mile (cents)
Amount
Change from preceding date
Total
Per Year
To peak from trough
To trough from peak
Conformity suggested by comparison



























































Arrows Trst month in increases ('1') or decreases of freight rates were effective throughout the month.
(a) on—miles inclcled in divisor.240 CHAPTER 9
end. Before 1908 it is hardly possible to pair cycles in annual aver-
age freight receipts with those in ton-miles (Chart 96).
CHART 98









Shaded periods are contractions in passenger—m[Ies -
Passenger-revenueper passenger-mile, in the period covered by
monthly data, fell in 2 of 4 expansions in travel, 3 of 5 contractions
(Table 81). In this period comparisons of the usual kind do not
consistently indicate either kind of conformity. On the other hand,
of 8 comparisons among earlier phases would count in favor of
inverse conformity. In the two exceptional instances, moreover,
the circumstances are peculiar. The positive score yielded by com-
paring 1914—15 with 1912—14 rests upon a minute difference in the
rate of change. Most of the rapid increase in 1915—20 occurred at
the time of the general increase in June 10, 1918, made in what
was actually a specific contraction (Ch. 2), concealed here by
annual data.3 'Wefeel unable to mark off any specific cycles in
unit passenger revenue in the period for which there are monthly
figures (Chart 98), and if we were to mark off any before that,
most of them would be extremely mild (Chart 99).
'Onthe other hand, 2 of the 6 inverse scorings are suspect, because they depend
on data for the long period 1897—1911. Annual figures force us to treat it as a single
expansion, although we know that monthly data would disclose several briefer
phases; comparisons involving the latter might yield some positive scores,Table 81
Revenue per Passenger-mile: Change per Month, 1920—38, and per Year,
1894—1922, between Peaks and Troughs in Passenger-miles
Turn in
passenger-miles Change from preceding date
Revenue
per

























































































































































a Three-monthaverage, 1920—38 section; date of turn is middle month.











Shaded per[ods are contractions in passenger—miles.
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Itdid conform positively to business in earlier times
Advocates of various theories about cyclical price changes pre-
sumably do not have cycles in railroad traffic specifically in mind.
It may be more appropriate to examine the changes during phases
dated in the light of a more general view of the economy, such as
those marked out by the reference chronology. Our comparisons
for phases of traffic start in the middle '90's, since the annual data
indicate no earlier cycles in traffic itself. Beginning about that
time, unit revenue was related to the reference chronology in much
the same way as it was to waves in traffic (Table 82). Revenue per
passenger-mile showed little conformity of either kind, revenue
per ton-mile conformed inversely, revenue per traffic unit perhaps
also conformed inversely but less consistently.
Before the middle '90's, however, conformity was on the whole
positive, especially in freight rates. This does not mean that the
railway companies increased their freight charges in the earlier
business expansions. On the contrary, rates fell in both expansion
and contraction (Table 84), but more rapidly in the latter.
Restricted competition may have altered conformity
The disappearance of positive conformity may have been a conse-
quence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and strengthening
amendments in 1903 and 1906, together with the growth of re-
strictive practices among the railroads themselves. The law re-
quired that rates be public and nondiscriminatory. A railway
traffic official who wished to make a concession to a necessitous,
insistent or important customer must now either violate the law
or advertise any change to competing roads and shippers. The
position of the latter in demanding corresponding treatment was
greatly strengthened, and the incentive to favor any one patron
correspondingly weakened. Prior to 1887 the carriers had relied
mainly on pooling of traffic, or of the revenue derived from it, in
fixed proportions, to control competition among themselves. Such
arrangements were outlawed by the Act. The companies turned
to direct control of rates, forming associations to which each mem-
ber reported in advance any proposed change. In 1897 the Su-
preme Court found the operations of such an organization con-
trary to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. But eventually—how soon
is not clear—the railroads interpreted the judgment as applyingI
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Table82
Unit Revenue
Conformity Suggested by Comparisons of Adjoining Reference Phases
Operating revenue per Freight revenue per Passenger revenue per
Terminal date of traffic unit (Table 8,3) ton-mile (Table 84) passenger-mile (Table 83)
second phaset
Annual Monthly Annual Monthly Annual Monthly






1887 Positive Positive Positive
1888 Positive Positive Positive
1890 Positive Positive Inverse
1891 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1893 Positive Positive Positive
1894 Positive Positive Positive
1896 Positive Inverse Positive
1897 Inverse Inverse Positive
1900 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1901 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1903 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1904 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1907 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1908 Positive Inverse Positive







1921 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1923 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1924 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1926 Inverse Inverse Positive
1927 Inverse Inverse None
1929 Positive Inverse Inverse
1932 Positive Inverse Positive
1937 Positive Positive Positive
1938 Inverse Inverse Inverse
1871—1894
No. Positive 5 9 4
No. Inverse 1 2 2
1896—1938
No. Positive 8 5 10
No. Inverse 16 19 13
tFormonthly data, terminal 1912 rather than 1911, 1914 rather than
1915, 1933 rather than 1932.244
Table 83
CHAPTER
Operating Revenueper Traffic Unit: Change per Month, 1908—38, and
per Year, 1882—19 10, between Reference Peaks and Troughs






























































































































































































































































































b Bycomparison with preceding rate, e.g., .0005 with .0020.
average, 1908—38 section; reference date is middle month.Table 84
Freight Revenue per Ton-mile:Change per Month,1908—38,and per
Year, 1868—1919, between Reference Peaks and Troughs
Change from preceding date
Revenue
per










































June 1908Trough .735 ... ... ...
Jan. 1910Peak .714 — .021 — .0011...
Jan. 1912Trough .683 — .031 ... — .0013
Jan. 1913Peak .691 .008 + ...
Dec. 1914Trough
C ••• ... ...
Aug. 1918Peak .857 ... ... ...
Apr. 1919Trough .913 .056 ... +
Jan. 1920Peak .899 — .014 — ...
Sept. 1921Trough 1.118 .219 ... +
May 1923Peak 1.017 — .101 — ...


















Dec. 1927Trough...1.100 .021 ... +
June 1929Peak 181.068 — .032 — .0018...
















1868 Trough...2.398 ... ... ... ...
1869 Peak 1 2.153 —.245 —.245 ... ...
1871 Trough 2 1.707 — .446 ... — .223 Inverse
1873 Peak 2 1.641 — .066 — .033 ... Positive
1878 Trough 5 1.051 — .590 ... — .118Positive
1882 Peak 4 .945 — .106 — .026 ... Positive
1885 Trough 3 .827 — .118 ... — .039 Positive
1882 Peak ... 1.236 ... ... ... ...
1885 Trough 3 1.057 — .179 ... — .059 ...
1887 Peak 2 1.034 — .023 — .012 ... Positive
1888 Trough 1 .977 — .057 ... — .057 Positive
1890 Peak 2 .927 — .050 — .025 ... Positive
1891 Trough 1 .929 .002 ... .002 Inverse
1890 Peak ... .941 ...
1• ...
1893 Peak 2 .878 —.017 —.008 ... Positive
1894 Trough 1 .860 —.018 ... — .018Positive
1896 Peak 2 .806 —.054 —.027... Inverse
1897 Trough 1 .708 .008 ... — .008Inverse
00 Peak 3 .729 —.069 —.023
1003 Peak 2 .763 .013 .006 ... Inverse
1904 Trough 1 .780 .017... .017Inverse
1907 Peak 3 .759 —.021—.007 ... Inverse
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Table 84—Concluded
Change from preceding date
MonthsRevenue Per month or year





1908 Trough 1 .754 —.005... — .005Inverse
1910 Peak 2 .753 —.001 .000e... Positive
1911 Trough 1 .757 .004... .004
1913 Peak 2 .729 —.028 —.014...
1915 Trough 2 .735 .006 ... .003Inverse
1918 Peak 3.5.862 .127 .036 ... Positive
1919' Trough 1 .987 .125... .125Inverse
a Three-month average 1908—23, 1921—38 sections; reference date is middle month.
Non-revenue ton-miles included in divisor, 1908—23 section.
bBycomparison with preceding rate; e.g., —.0013with —.0011.
oNodata.
dSeecomparison on basis of annual data.
More exactly, —.0005.
See comparison on basis of monthly data.
only to agreements by which they bound themselves to accept the
decision of the association, and perhaps to pay fines for noncom-
pliance. They again began to give one another notice; competing
roads' at least had an opportunity to exercise persuasion. Mean-
while, some of the major roads started to buy the stock of their
competitors on a large scale, apparently with control of rates as
one objective, although some of the acquisitions were liquidated
after a few years.4
Effect of general rate proceedings
Although restrictions on competition might account for the dis-
appearance of positive, it is hard to see how it could actually
cause inverse conformity, which is what we find, at least in freight
service, for the most part from the 1890's onward. This kind of
For a discussion of the legislation, associations, and combinations, see for ex-
ample, Kent T. Healy The Economics of Transportation in America (Ronald Press,
1940), pp. 263—9, 381—92, and the court decisions and ICC investigations there cited;
also Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Railroad in the
Eastern Region, Part I (Before 1920), 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Senate Report 1182,
194,0.PRICES AND WAGES 247
Table 85
Revenue per Passenger-mile: Change per Month, 1919—38, and per Year,











Change from preceding date
Conformity Total




























































































































































































































r\ .41 90 -
bBy with ratc,e.g.,.030 with .000.
More exactly, .0005.248 CELAPTER 0
conformity is explained in part by general rate changes, which be-
came a conspicuous feature of the industry's price-making around
the end of World War I and again in the great depression. They
differ from ordinary rate-making activity by the roads and the
ICC in that each applied more or less simultaneously to a wide
range of coimnodities and the principal reason each was approved
was the supposed need of the carriers for greater earnings, or, in
1922, the supposed need of the country for lower transportation
charges as an aid to economic recovery. All except one of the gen-
eral changes made for inverse conformity. Several months after a
peak in business had been passed, freight rates were raised 25 to
40 percent, effective August 26, Small increases were made
on January 4, 1932, toward the end of the long contraction.6 The
ICC approved a series of rises in On the other hand, the
Commission ordered a general reduction of 10 percent effective
July 1, 1922, about midway in a business expansion. The small
increases made early in 1932 were still in effect at the begin-
ning of the following long expansion. They were allowed to ex-
pire with September 30, 1933. New emergency increases became
effective April 18, 1935 but were reduced on July 1, 1936 and ex-
pired altogether at the end of the The net effect as between
the beginning and end of the phase was the removal of the 1932
increases. The only general change that did not tend to promote
inverse conformity was the 25 percent increase ordered by the
Director-General of Railroads effective June 25, 1918, a few
months before the reference peak in August. Even this change
promoted inverse conformity to freight traffic, since the peak
in ton-miles was reached in April. The other general changes
bear the same relation to the specific phases in traffic as they do
to those in business. They also invariably help account for specific
phases in revenue per ton-mile (Chart 97).
Whatever chronology we use, however, several pairs of phases
Rates, 1920, 58 ICC 220.
6FifteenPercent Case, 1931, 178 ICC 539, 179 ICC 215, 191 ICC 361. The opinion
last cited (p. 365) indicates that even without allowance for subsequent reductions
voluntarily made by the railroads to meet competition of other means of transport,
they average only 2.6 percent on all freight traffic.
'GeneralCommodity Rate Increases, 1937, 223 ICC 657; Fifteen Percent Case, 226
ICC 41.
8EmergencyFreight Charges, 208 ICC 4, 215 ICC 439.PRICES AND WAGES 249
before World War I and during the 1920's suggest inverse con-
formity, although no general changes in rates occurred in them.
We have no statistical test delicate enough to find the remainder
of the explanation. It may lie in minor rate adjustments, in the
varying composition of traffic, or in both. Rates per unit of weight
are usually higher, for comparable hauls, on lightly loaded than
on heavily loaded commodities. The inversely conforming relative
importance of the lightly loaded articles makes for inversely con-
forming revenue per ton-mile.
NO WAVE-LIKE CYCLES IN WAGE RATES
Railroad companies employ many kinds of workers and pay them
at various rates. As in the case of freight charges, there is no
comprehensive index. We cannot tell precisely how the aggregate
bill a railroad would have to pay for a labor force of fixed size and
composition has changed. Instead we must use a figure, average
hourly earnings, computed by dividing the total payments for
straight-time hours by the number of straight-time hours paid for.
It is affected by changes in the rates specified in employment con-
tracts. But it is affected by changes in the composition of the
working force also. If, for example, employment of low-paid
workers falls more drastically than employment of high-paid
workers, the average will rise, even though no wage contract has
been altered. On the other hand, since the figure is derived from
straight-time data, it is not affected by changes in the proportion
of overtime or of time paid for but not worked to total time. And
in fact, it clearly reflects even rather minor general changes in
wage rates. It pertains only to 'hourly' workers.
During the period covered by our data, wage rates were
determined largely by collective bargaining, supplemented occa-
sionally by the intervention of government agencies. The more
important changes emerging from such proceedings have usually
been nationwide, applicable to large groups of occupations, and
concentrated on a single date or within a few months. Conse-
quently, the national average shows abrupt variations. Many
wage rates were cut in July 1922 in accordance with three de-
cisions (Nos. 1028, 1036, 1074) by the Railway Labor Board. The
average drops sharply in that month (Chart 100). Afterwards it
rises gradually until the end of 1931. Up to 1929 this increase is250 CHAPTER 9
the result, in part at least, of various collective bargaining agree-
ments, affecting sometimes one craft in one area, sometimes
another craft in another area. The continued rise after 1929 must
reflect a change in the composition of the labor force, as there
were apparently no substantial increases in rates. Effective Janu-
ary 1, 1932, managers and workers agreed upon a 10 percent re-
duction in the contents of pay envelopes; the agreement was
extended on the condition that the deduction was to become
percent. on July 1, 1934 and 5 percent on January 1, 1935, and
was to cease on April 1, 1935. Finally, again by collective bar-
gaining, wages in other than train and engine service were raised
5centsan hour on August 1, 1937, and those in train and engine
service approximately 5.5 cents on October 1.9 All these read-
justments are clearly reflected in Chart 100.
CHART100
Straight-timeHourly Earnings,Occupationsforwhich Hoursare













The history of wage rates is traced briefly by the Emergency Board appointed
September 27, 1938 under Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, Report to the Presi-
dent, pp. 3—7, and more fully by Harry E. Jones, Wages and Labor Relations in the
Railway Industry, 1900—1941 (Bureau of Information of the Eastern Railways),
Part I.
Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.PRICES AND WAGES 251
If we ignore the abrupt intermediate changes and concentrate
our attention on the beginning and end of pha.ses, we find that
there was a net rise in 3 of the 4 expansions, but also in 3 of the
4 contractions. A bare majority of the comparisons—4 of 7—indi-
cate inverse conformity. One of the other 3 pertains to the cycle
which, judged by either the changes in traffic or those in the econ-
omy at large, was the most violent of all—the peak-to-peak cycle
1929—37. It might be expected to provide the clearest of all ex-
amples of cyclical variation in wages; and wages fell in the con-
traction, rose in the expansion, i.e., conformed positively.
It should also be obvious from Chart 100 that wage rates did
not follow any typical course within a phase. In the 1921—23 ex-
pansion they remained fairly stable for some months, then fell
abruptly, then rose, but were well below their initial level at the
end. This is quite unlike the course of events in 1924—26 and 1927—
29, when wages rose more or less throughout the phase, and ended
higher than at the beginning. None of these three pha.ses is like
1932—37, when the average remained practically constant for many
months, then rose abruptly in three quick steps, then again re-
mained level for a long time. The diversity of pattern is equally
striking in contractions. In each of the first two there was a
roughly continuous rise. Such a rise characterized most of 1929—
32, but toward the etid there was an abrupt drop to a level below
that at the traffic peak. In 1937—38 we find still another pattern:
an abrupt rise shortly before the middle of the phase, and little
variation at either end.
Workers and managers did not evolve national procedures for
the negotiation of wages until the first World War. There were no
abrupt countrywide changes. If we had data on avera.ge rates
during earlier cycles they might show a more regular and perhaps
positive relation to cycles in traffic or in business.
PURCHASING POWER IN MAN-HOURS OF PRICES RECEIVED
DECLINED MORE RAPIDLY IN EXPANSION
The sudden and abrupt alterations in the course of hourly earnings
cto not mean cnerices
ceived by the industry for its services and the wage rates it paid
followed the same jaggedly irregular course. Some of the general
readjustments of wages were accompanied or closely followed by252 CHAPTER 9
moreor less compensating general readjustments of charges for
transportation. General reductions in freight rates became effec-
tive on July 1, 1922, the date of the wage The restoration
of wage rates to their pre-1932 level on April 1, 1935 was followed
within the month by general advances in freight charges. The
wage advances of August and October 1937 were followed during
the winter by progressively broadening increases of rates. On the
other hand, the reduction of wage rates on February 1, 1932 had
been preceded on January 4 by increases in freight rates; in this
instance both changes tended to widen the margin between prices
and costs.
We may express the relation between prices received and wage
rates in the form of a ratio, dividing receipts per 100 traffic units
by the average payment for an hour of labor. In January 1923,
for example, revenue per traffic unitwas1.2423 cents or 124.23
cents per 100 units. Average straight-time hourly earnings were
55.5 cents. The proceeds from the performance of 100 units of ser-
vice could therefore pay for 124.23 ÷ 55.5 or 2.238 hours of labor.
Such a ratio will rise from month to month if unit revenue goes
up faster than hourly earnings, or goes up while they remain un-
changed or decline, or if it declines less rapidly than hourly pay.
If the latter rises relatively to unit revenue, the ratio will decline.
In fact the ratio tended to decline throughout the period 1921—
38 (Chart 101). There was a net fall between the beginning and
end of every phase (Table 86). The relation did, however, con-
form to cycles in traffic—inversely; with two exceptions the ratio
fell more rapidly in expansion than in contraction. In 1923—24 it
actually rose for a while, although the increase was subsequently
lost. In 1929—32, on the other hand, it might have fallen more
rapidly than in the preceding expansion if the freight rate and
wage adjustments at the beginning of 1932 had not boosted the
level for the rest of the phase.
The declines in the ratio of prices received to average hourly
earnings were unfavorable to railway unit profits. If man-hours
per traffic unit, materials used per traffic unit, and the ratio of
unit revenue to materials prices had remained as they were in the
initial stage, profit per dollar of revenue would have fallen in every
phase, but more rapidly in the expansions. Profit per traffic unitTable 86
Ratio of Operating Revenue per 100 Traffic Units to Straight-time Hourly Earnings
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units, 1921—1938
Date of turn July Apr. June July Dec. Aug. Aug. Mar. May
1921 1923 1924 1926 1927 1929 1932 1937 1938
Level of traffic units Trough PeakTrough PeakTrough PeakTrough PeakTrough
Months from preceding date .. 21 14 25 17 20 36 55 14
2.466" 2.194 2.190 2.089 2.004 1.960 1.917 1.523 1.481
Changefrom preceding date
Total —.272 —.004 —.101 .085 —.044 —.043 —.394 —.042
Permonth
To peak from trough —.0130 ... — .0040 .., — .0022 ... — .0072
To trough from peak ... — .0003 ... — .0050 ... — .0012 ... — .0030
Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.
bAveragefor July and August only; no data for June.254 CHAPTER 9
CHART 101
Ratio of Revenue per 100 Traffic Units to Straight-time Hourly Earn-











Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
Table 87
Estimated Effect of Changes in Price-wage Relations
Traffic Unit, 1921—1938
on Profit per

































































































Col. 6 and 7 show what would have happened if unit revenue and hourly earnings
had changed in each phase as they did, but man-hours per traffic unit and non-
labor costs per traffic unit had remained constant.
From Table 78.
bAveragefor three months (two in 1921) of initial or terminal stage.
Computed from data for Chart 89.
d Computed from data for Chart 100.PRICES AND WAGES 255
would have fallen in all four expansions, but in only two contrac-
tions (Table 87) •1o
PRICESPAID FOR RAILWAY SUPPLIES DID RISE AND FALL WITH
BUSINESS AND TRAFFIC
Wages account for about 55 to 60 percent of railway operating
expenses; amounts paid for commodities and services furnished to
the railroads by business enterprises account for roughly 30—35
percent (Table 88, col. 1 and 3, Sec.
There is nothing approaching a monthly index of prices paid by
railroads until relatively recent times. In the familiar Bureau of
Labor Statistics wholesale price indexes, however, we have a
monthly record of prices paid by business men generally for the
kind of things railroads use. The indexes for 'fuel and lighting',
'metals and metal products', and 'building materials' are of most
interest from this point of view. Railroads cannot spend more than
a minor percentage of their total outlay on commodities in the
other seven main BLS categories. Broadly speaking, all three
indexes have conformed simply and positively to cycles in traffic.
Since 1908 venders of these articles at wholesa'e have charged
higher prices at the end of each expansion than at its beginning,
lower prices at each trough than at the preceding peak (Table 89).
With data for each of three groups in each of 16 phases we have
48 instances in all; only 8 (marked E in the table) are exceptions
to the rule. In no phase were the changes for all three groups ex-
ceptional.
The chances are that these indexes do not represent the move-
ment of prices paid by railroads with any great exactness as to
either percentage variation between turning points or relative
rates of change in successive stages of a phase. The weights as-
10Lett =trafficunits, 1 =man-hours(with an overtime hour counted as 1.5
hours), q =quantityof r =unitrevenue,
w =straight-timehourly earnings, p =priceof materials. Then profit per dollar
of revenue (before depreciation, rents, interest, etc.)(tr —1w—qp)÷ tr =
1—l/tX w/r —q/tX p/r. Changes in it are opposite to those in any one of the
ratios lIt,w/r,oft, or n/r, provided the other three do not change. (The
w/r and p/r are the reciprocals of those discussed in the text.) Profit per traffic
unit =r—litX w —q/tX p, and its direction of change cannot be determined
from information about ratios alone.
11Ifwe exclude depreciation, which does not represent current outlays, from ex-
penses the percentages become somewhat higher (Sec. B of table).256 CHAPTER
Table 88
Charges to Operating Expenses













































































































































































































































a Total except pensions, 1921—32, taken from Bureau of Railway Economics, &atis-
tics of Railways of Class I, 1916—PdO, and
b Residual, (4) minus sum of (1) and (2). Must consist almost entirely of expendi-
tures for commodities and services purchased from business enterprises, although
small amounts not of that character—retirements of property and perhaps other
items—are included.
°Includescost of delivering to locomotives or rail motor cars. Does not include
fuel and power for switching, heating buildings, etc. Part of the expenses in this
column are included in (1) and the remainder in (3).
dSectionB, (1) + (7); SectionC, (1) + (5) + (7). As indicated by the preceding
notes, these totals include a small amount of duplication.Table 8
Unit and BLS Wholesale Price Indexes at Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units, 1008—1938
Turn :itrafficunits Group indexes (1926: 100) Purchasing power of revenue over Purchasing
Revenue per Index all power of
10,000units Metals & commoditiescommodities
materials (1926: 100)over railway
(8) Fuel & Metals & Building Fuel& metal Building
service
Dat', Le, lightingmetal productsmaterials products (1) ÷ (4) (8) (1)0 (l)÷(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6) (7) (8) (9) TP
JuneID) I Tro.;gh 79.87 53.1 84.9 51.8 150 .94 1.54 62.6 .78
Apr. 84.09E48.3 87.0 55.3E1.74E.97 1.52 72.7 .86
Mar. 84.10 47.1 82.1E 56.1 1.79 1.02 E 1.50 64.1 .76
Feb. 79.24 62.9 95.9 57,6 1.26 .83 1.38 70.0 .88
Dec. 19: 81.60 52.0 78.0 50.6 1.57 1.05 1.61 67.6 .83
May Peak 88.21 108.8 132.4 97.7 .81 .67 .90 128.5 1.46
Mar. 1i1-) 112.51 101.7 128.3E 99.d 1.11 .88 1.14E 131.4 1.17
Feb. 114.55 123.6 147.0 162.6 .93 .78 .71 157.8 1.38
July Trm:gh 144.01 84.2 117.0 94.3 1.71 1.23 1.53 03.4 .65
Apr. 19? Pea.. 123.20 105.2 E 111.8 114.0 1.17 1.10 1.08 103.4 .84
June Tro:.gh 126.69 91.9 104.4 101.4 1.38 1.21 1.25 95.5 .75
July 191'H 122.37 100.3 E 100.1E 99.5 1.22 E 1.22 1.23 99.7 .81
Dee. 191.' Trogh 120.90 84.2 95.7 91.9 1.44 1.26 1.32 96.4 .80
Aug. PeaL 122.38E 82.7 100.6 95.4 E 1.48 1.22 1.28E 06.3 E.79
Aug. 191' Troigh 112.99 71.7 79.8 69.9 1.58 1.42 1.62 65.0 .58
Mar. 191, PeaL 98.62 76.6 94.7 95.3 1.20 1.04 1.04 87.4 .89
May 1D)3 Troi.gh 104.50 76.5E 96.4 90.4 1.37 1.08 1.16 78.4 .75
Allfiguresa averages; date ofturn is middle month. Incomputing columns 5, 6, 7, and9divisions were performedfor
each monti3parately a::d the three quotients averaged. E indicates exceptions to the rules stated in the text.
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signed the various commodities doubtless do not closely reflect
their importance in railway purchasing. The companies may buy
many articles on long-term contracts and therefore at prices that
do not change as quickly as those in spot markets. Nevertheless,
it appears safe to conclude that the general direction is indicative;
railways are faced with rising prices for the commodities they
need in expansion and benefit from falling prices in contraction.
Table 90
Operating Revenue per 10,000 Traffic Units, BRE Index of Prices of
Railway Materials, Supplies and Fuel, and Ratio of Former to Latter,

















































a Average for month preceding and month following date.
bLetterfrom Julius H. Parmelee, Director, Bureau of Railway Economics, July
28,1945.
Forthe most recent cycle we have more apposite evidence that
this is true in the indexes prepared by the Bureau of Railway
Economics and pertaining specifically to the industry it serves.
Although the figures are not monthly the intervals between the
dates to which they apply are fairly short. They show that prices
of railway materials, fuel, and supplies rose steadily from May 1,
1933 to April 1, 1937, then fell to December 1, 1938 (Table 90).
The Railway Age has ôomputed an annual index of prices paid
by railroads, for 1914 and subsequent years. It rises in every ex-
pansion of traffic except 1924—26, falls in every contraction except
1918—19 (Table 91). Peaks and troughs in the index, when present,
corresponded to those in traffic, except for a trough in 1922 rather
than 1921, and another in 1933 rather than 1932.PRICES AND 259
Table91
Operating Revenue per 10,000 Traffic Units, Railway Age Index of Prices
















1914 Trough 82.45b 100 .8245
1915 82.58b 107 .7718
1916 80.56 137 .5880
1917 81.86 177 .4625
1918 Peak 95.88 212 .4523
1919 Trough 107.87 216 .4994
1920 Peak 117.87 236 .4994
1921 Trough 138.78 187 .7421
1922 130.66 179 .7299
1923 Peak 124.56 194 .6421
1924 Trough 124.37 189 .6580
1925 122.16 184 .6639
1926 Peak 120.44 183 .6581
1927 120.20 .6715
1928 Trough 119.91 178 .6737
1929 Peak 120.11 180 .6673
1930 117.72 173 .6805
1931 115.56 162 .7133
1932 Trough 113.61 151 .7524
1933 107.13 149 .7190
1934 104.68 165 .6344
1935 105.58 167 .6322
1936 102.93 173 .5950
1937 Peak 99.07 186 .5326
1938 Trough 104.06 180 .5781
1939 102.84 175 .5877
1940 99.69 179 .5569
1941 97.85 189 .5177
aRailway Age, Vol.112, P. 82 (Jan. 3, 1942).
bThere areno calendar year figures on revenue or traffic in Statisticsof Railways.
We obtained them. by totaling monthly figures: revenue as reported by ICC, ton-
miles as estimated by Babson, passenger.miles as estimated in Chapter 2. Passenger-
miles converted to traffic units by multiplying by 2.430 (see Oh. 3). The same pro-
cedure applied to 1916 yields revenue per 10,000 units of $84.15 instead of $80.56.
The decline from 1914—15 to 1916—18 in col. 3 is therefore probably somewhat
exaggerated.260 CHAPTER 9
Before 1908 we have only the BLS figures. Since we are con-
fined to annual data on revenue per traffic unit, we have stated
the commodity indexes in annual form for comparison. They
portray prices as rising in expansions, falling in contractions from
1893 to 1908 (Table 92). There were only 2 exceptions in 15 cases:
prices of fuel and lighting rose in 1893—95 and in 1907—08.
Table 92
Revenue per 10,000 Traffic Units, BLS Wholesale Price Indexes, and
Ratios, 189 1—1908•
Base of Four Indexes, 1926:100
RevenueIndexRatioIndexRatio d Ratio Ratio
Year T per fuel of metals of of Index all of
ended 10,000and (1) & (1) (1)commodities(8)
Junent unitslightingto metal to a to to
30 '
(8) (2)products (4) (6) (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1891 97.8937.42.62100.8 .9746.12.12 57.1 .58
1892 97.2535.62.73 86.81.1242.32.30 53.1 .55
1893Peak 95.4535.52.69 82.21.1641.92.28 54.4 .57
1894 93.51 2.65 69.61.3440.62.30 49.7 .53
1895Trough93.8337.02.54 64.41.4639.02.41 48.4 .52
1896Peak 90.7240.52.24 74.21.2238.92.33 48.0 .53
1897Trough89.9937.02.43 68.21.3238.22.36 46.1 .51
1898 85.2432.72.61 64.51.3236.52.21 48.3 .57
1899 82.7036.92.24 77.71.0640.52.04 49.1 .59
1900 82.4946.91.76108.1 .7646.5 1.77 55.6 .67
1901 84.0943.81.92 91.3 .9244.51.89 55.0 .65
1902 84.3145.21.87 92.2 .9144.6 1.89 56.7 .67
1903 84.9961.01.39 92.7 .9246.4 1.83 60.3 .71
1904 86.8756.21.5583.61.0445.91.8959.1 .68
1905 85.4050.31.70 83.51.0245.41.8860.0 .70
1906 84.1050.91.6594.7.8951.61.6360.5 .72
1907Peak 85.3352.81.62112.5 .7656.21.52 63.6 .75
1908Trough84.6054.51.55 93.8 .9054.3 1.56 63.8 .75
Priceindexes are straight averages of 12monthly figures.
Anexamination of price changes between reference dates would
reveal that they conform to business in much the same way as to
traffic.
CHANGES IN PRICE RELATIONS UNFAVORABLE TO RAILWAY
PROFITS IN EXPANSION, FAVORABLE IN CONTRACTION
We conclude from foregoing sections that the prices the railroad
companies charged for their services rose little if at all during ex-PRICES AND WAGES 261
pansions, while their suppliers did raise prices substantially in
most cases. In contractions prices of commodities tumbled; unit
revenue did not fall correspondingly.
The point of these comparisons may be emphasized by dividing
the BLS indexes into revenue per traffic unit. The effect is to dis-
close at least roughly the changes in the purchasing power over
commodities of the revenue derived from rendering a fixed and
specified quantity of transportation services. A few specimen
computations will make the process clear. The BLS index for
metals and metal products may be thought of as telling us that a
certain assortment of such articles could be bought for $100 in
1926. It tells us also what the same assortment of commodities in
the same quantities would have cost at other dates. In August
1932, for example, the price of the batch would have been $80.10.
Revenue per traffic unit was 1.1482 cents. The performance of
10,000 units of service brought the railroads a revenue of $114.82.
With this sum they could have bought 114.82 ÷ 80.10 or 1.4335
assortments, batches, or 'baskets' of metals and metal products.
In March 1937, 10,000 traffic units yielded a revenue of $99.33,
considerably less than in 1932. Meanwhile the price of the assort-
ment had risen to $96.00. Consequently, with the proceeds from
the 10,000 units the railroads could buy oniy 99.33 ÷ 96.00 or
1.0347 'baskets' of metal articles.
Such computations for the three groups of commodities in six-
teen phases suggest that the purchasing power of the revenue from
10,000 traffic units usually diminished in expansions and increased
in contractions (Chart 102). Comparisons between the beginning
and end of a phase indicate exceptions in oniy 5 of 48 instances
(Table 89).
Similar ratios of unit revenue to the BRE index of prices paid
show that the purchasing power from 10,000 units fell in the
1932—37 expansion and rose in the 1937—38 contraction (Table 90).
Computations based on Railway Age data indicate the same thing
nil 21) 1224
Finally,calculations with the aid of the annual BLS data up to
1908 suggest the same conclusions, except with respect to fuel and
lighting in 1893—95 and 1907—08 (Table 92).262 CHAPTER
Table 93
Estimated Effect of Changes in Price Relations on Profit per Traffic
Unit, 1908—38, 1914—38, 1893—1908
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Table93—Continued
Columns 4 and 5 show what would have happened if unit revenue and prices of
materials had changed in each phase as they did, but materials used per traffic
unit and labor cost per traffic unit had remained constant.
No comparisons based on the BRE price index are included above, since it is
clear from the direction of change in unit revenue and prices paid that the net
tendency of changes in the two was to reduce unit profit in the expansion, raise
it in the contraction.
Derivation of column 1: Section A, from Table 78; B, computed from peak and
trough data in Table 91, col. 1; C, from Table 78.
Column 2: A, operating expense, excluding depreciation, per traffic unit, initial
stage, Table 97, minus labor cost per traffic unit, Table 87. B, computed from cor-
responding annual data, except that compensation of employees charged to capital
account is excluded from computation)' C, similar to B, but depreciation is in-
cluded in total expense and compensation charged to capital account in labor
expense. On the propriety of using total expense minus labor expense as an ap-
proximate measure of materials expense, see Table 88.
Column 3: A, may be illustrated by computations for the 1911-13 expansion:
BLS index of fuel and lighting (Table 89), initial stage 47.1, terminal stage 62.9,
ratio terminal to initial 62.9 ÷ 47.1 =1.34.Corresponding ratio for metals and
products 1.17, building materials 1.03. Straight average of ratios, (1.34 + 1.17 +
1.03) ÷ 3 =1.18.Index of change, 1.18 —1.00=.18.B, similar indexes computed
from peak and trough data in Table 91, col. 2. C, similar to A, from annual BLS
indexes in Table 92.
aInitialmaterials cost was certainly higher than .0726t in 1914—18 or in
1919—20, and probably higher than in 1893—95; any higher figure would yield
a change in unit cost larger than the change in unit revenue.
bSincea calendar year expense figure is needed for 1914, we have derived one from
monthly data; cf. Table 91, note b.
Thechangein price relations teiided to reduce railway profits in
expansion. It meant that if the companies had to use the same
quantities of commodities per unit of traffic at all times, materials
expense per dollar of revenue would rise. If non-commodity ele-
ments of cost remained a constant percentage of revenue, profits
per dollar of revenue would diminish. Conversely in contractions,
changing if not offset by changes in otherfactors,
mightcause an increase in the profit ratio (cf. note 10),
If materials used per traffic unit and non-commocilty expense
per traffic unit had retrained at their initial levels in each phase,
the changes in unit revenue and in prices paid would have reduced
tractions (Table g3). Under co must grow
enough in expansion to offset the unfavorable net effect of the
changes in prices received and paid, or aggregate profit wouldCHART 102
Ratio of Revenue per 10,000 Traffic Units (in dollars) to Three BLSWholesalePrice Indexes (1926:100), July 1907—December
1938
Ratio






























































decline.Traffic must diminishenoughin contraction to offset the
favorable realignment of prices, or aggregate profit would increase.
CHANGES FAVORABLE TO OTHER INDUSTRIES IN EXPANSION,
UNFAVORABLE IN CONTRACTION
Not only prices of railway supplies but those of commodities in
general have usually risen in expansion and fallen in contraction,
absolutely and relatively to the prices of railway services. The
cyclical change in the relation may be illustrated at least crudely
by dividing the revenue from 10,000 units into the BLS wholesale
index for all commodities (Chart 103). The ratio of prices to unit
revenue increased in every expansion from 1908 to 1938, except
1927—29, diminished in every contraction (Table 89). Calculations
from annual data indicate a similar relation from 1893 t.o 1907,
although not in 1907—08 (Table 92).. We infer that a busi-
ness enterprise found its margin between the prices it received for
its goods and its rail transport cost per unit of product widening
in expansion and narrowing in contraction. Unit transport costs
to an enterprise could rise, or fall, it is true, even if no railroad
altered any rate or fare.12 But we hazard the opinion that such
possibilities were not ordinarily of enough consequence to offset
the effects on margins suggested by our data.
The alternately favorable and adverse effects of inflexible rail
rates on unit business profits may, of course, have been counter-
balanced or more than counterbalanced by changes in nontrans-
port elements of cost. In many industries, several of the latter are
far more important.
12 This could happen as a result of changes in the proportions in which different
materials (some having low and some high transport costs) enter the productive
process, resort to more distant or less distant sources for any one material, changes
in the amount of business traveling per unit of product, substitution of Pullman
for coach journeys or vice versa, redistribution of sales as between near and dis-
tant markets, diversion of traffic to or from non-rail transport, etc.